Indiana Law Journal
Volume 4

Issue 9

6-1929

Voting Trusts
Robert W. Miller

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Miller, Robert W. (1929) "Voting Trusts," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 4 : Iss. 9 , Article 3.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol4/iss9/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Article 3

VOTING TRUSTS
ROBERT W. MJMLL

*

A decided conflict among the authorities exists as to whether
or not stocklholders may surrender their voting power and
irrevocably vest it in others, either permanently or for a stated
period of time. A number of methods have been employed by
groups seeking to tie up a majority of the voting stock of a
corporation, the voting trust seemingly being the best of the
group in spite of the existing conflict. 1 The paucity of decisions
on this point, however, makes the law hard to define.
What then is a voting trust? A voting trust may be comprehensively defined as one created by an agreement between a
group of the stockholders of a corporation and a trustee, or by
a group of identical agreements between individual stockholders
and a common trustee, whereby it is provided that for a term
of years, or for a period contingent upon a certain event, or
until the agreement is terminated, control over the stock owned
by such stockholders, either for certain purposes or for all,
shall be lodged in the trustee, either with or without a reservation to the owners or persons designated by them of the powers
to direct how such control shall be used. It is essential, however, that the ownership of the stock and the voting power be
separated in order to have a voting trust.2
Although the past forty years have seen voting trusts used
with greater frequency, the question as their enforcbility, in
the absence of a governing statute, has given considerable cause
for argument. Needless to say, different courts have reached
opposite conclusions and many writers today hold that the
weight of authority regards voting trusts illegal per se; while
others state the law otherwise. Hence, disregarding the weight
of authority, which ever way it may be, the purpose of this
article is to determine whether or not voting trusts should be
* See p. 608 for biographical note.
1 (1) Use of holding companies which hold a majority of the shares of

the subsidiary. (-2) Sometimes by agreement between stockholders to vote
together. (3) Classification of stock, voting rights being had in only a
small class. (4) Sometimes by an agreement whereby proxies were given
to trustees with power to vote as they may be directed or may determine.
2 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations-Vol. III, p. 2871.
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upheld; an attempt being made to present the arguments on
both sides in an unbiased manner.
What are the arguments then against enforcing voting
trusts? As one court has said:
"The duty which each stockholder owes his fellow stockholder, is to
so use such power and means as the law and his ownership of stock give
him, that the general interests of stockholders shall be protected, and the
general welfare of the corporation sustained, and its business conducted
by its agents, managers and officers, so far as may be, upon prudent and
honest business principles, and with just as little temptation to and opportunity for fraud, and the seeking of individual gains at the sacrifice of the
general welfare as possible. * * * He may shirk it perhaps by refusing
to attend stockholders' meetings, or by declining to vote when called upon,
but the law will not allow him to strip himself of the power to perform
his duty."3

This objection, then, is merely that a stockholder is entitled
to the benefit of the deliberation and judgment of all the other
stockholders. However, since one stockholder has no legal right
to the deliberation of another stockholder, is not this a fallacious
objection? Furthermore, in our present day corporation with
its widely diversified group of stockholders, is it not a practical
impossibility for many such stockholders to take an active part
in the affairs of the corporation?
Another argument often raised against voting trusts is that
public policy is opposed to a separation of the power to vote
and the beneficial ownership, otherwise than where a revocable
proxy or agreement is had. Those urging this objection feel
that public policy frowns on the management of a corporation
by those without direct pecuniary interest. Seemingly, they
regard the voting power as a protection of the beneficial ownership of the stock; a divorce of such power permitting the trustees
to act oppressively or fraudulently. Then again, others urge
that all combinations among members of a class, which exclude
some of the members of that class, does violence to public policy
in that such a discrimination is abhorred by the common law.
Perhaps a reply can be had in citing a quotation from Mr.
Justice Holmes in which, in discussing the public policy of a
voting trust, he says:
"*

*

*

although it is impossible to view such an agreement without

suspicion" still "it is also impossible to let suspicion take the place of
a Bostwick v. Chapman, (1890) 60 Conn. 553. Luthy v. Ream, (1915)
270 Ill. 170.
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proof. We know nothing of the policy of our law to prevent a majority
of stockholders from transferring their stock to a trustee with unrestricted
power to vote upon it."4

A further argument made against voting trusts is that they
are nothing more than a proxy, hence, since a statute is necessary to authorize an ordinary revocable proxy, the absence of
a statute authorizing an irrevocable separation of the voting
_power from the beneficial ownership of the stock, condemns such
an agreement. Those making this objection regard the "trustee"
merely as an agent and the agreement as a collective revocable
proxy. How, then, can this objection be answered, if at all?
Perhaps the fact that the voting trust does not create an agency
relationship, but a trust relationship, makes it distinguishable
from a proxy. Further, a voting trust is in the nature of a
power coupled with an interest. In reality, it is a real trust;
the power to vote not alone being delegated, but the legal
title, which carries the power to vote, being the thing transferred. While it is probably true that the agreement would
only constitute a revocable power if it were a dry trust, still,
since it is really an active trust, both by reason of the power
and duty to vote and by the interest each stockholder has in
the participation of the others in the agreement, it does not fail
on that ground. Hence, although the Legislature could express
the intention of permitting the voting power and beneficial
ownership of stock to be separated, the mere fact that it has
not done so is no argument against such a voting trust
agreement.
Then there is the argument that such an agreement constitutes a restraint on alienation. As a necessary incident to the
creation of an ordinary voting trust, certain evidences of title
known as voting trust certificates are issued. The exact legal
status of these certificates, like the enforcibility of the agreement at all, is, as yet, far from settled. However, since the
trust certificates may be bought and sold, subject, of course, to
the trust agreement, the restraint against alienation argument
does not seem tenable.
"It is true that, as a rule, those who have the largest interests in a
corporation are entitled to control its affairs; and where a combination to
effect such a result is entered into for a fixed, definite, and reasonable
4 Brightman v. Bates, (1900)

175 Mass. 105.
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time, * * * it is not necessarily obnoxious to the rule which condemns
as illegal all contracts in restraint of alienation."S

A further argument that is sometimes advanced is that a
voting trust is contrary to the idea of corporate management in
that it makes for the possibility of having the minority control
the majority. This may occur where sixty per cent of the stockholders have placed their stock with the trustee and only thirty
per cent of this group are in favor of some action by the trustee
as regards corporate management. One reply to this objection
is that since a majority of the stockholders were in favor of
vesting control in a trustee, the action by the trustee is the
action by the majority.
Then there is the ever present objection that no one but the
stockholders can have as strong an interest in the prosperity of
the corporation, since they are the actual beneficial owners of
the stock. Those raising this argument contend that a trustee
who does not receive dividends can not be vitally interested in
the corporation's success. This statement may be seen to be
false where the corporation was in trouble before the trust
agreement was entered into; the agreement being the only basis
for creditors increasing loans to the corporation. With prosperity ensuing to the corporation and stockholders, management having been vested in a trustee, the answer to this objection seems complete.
Having briefly stated some of the main objections advanced
against voting trusts, what may be said in favor of such agreements? Certainly the repeated efforts of lawyers, business men,
and others to make use of such agreements must be deemed
indicative of the fact that in certain cases such an arrangement
seems necessary to protect investing interests. It is obvious
that a voting trust agreement provides one way for a contintous
business policy.
"There are few moneyed corporations, the management of which is not
liable to change hands, every year, by the requirement of law or charter
that the board of directors shall be chosen annually. Where the stock is
held but by a few persons and as a permanent investment, no inconvenience
results, because the annual election is usually a re-election; but in a case
of new enterprises, or corporations with a widely distributed capital,
unless some one man or family holds an interest so large as to be practically controlling, changes will not be infrequent. Under such circumstances a vacillating policy often results. Plans of direction may be abandoned, when but half tried, for others which meet no better fate. This
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is a real evil, and the 'voting trust' is the remedy, to which, of late years,
there has been frequent resort." 6

Further, just what rights does a creditor have in regard to
the internal management of a solvent corporation? Practically
none. On the other hand, there are numerous cases where a
voting trust agreement has been used to a great advantage as
an arrangement to secure the interests of creditors of a corporation in distress. Many instances can be cited where, instead of
forcing the corporation into insolvency, creditors have given
an extension of credit, provided management and control of
the corporation is transferred to them as security for additional
loans. Certainly a great economic evil is avoided by such a votting trust agreement.
It may be safely said that the courts which take the practical,
economic view realize that, in the reorganization of a corporation, often times banking interests may be willing to invest only
if continuity of an approved and satisfactory business policy is
absolutely assured. As has been seen, where large corporations
are concerned, it is practically impossible for the average shareholder to vote intelligently on business questions. Hence, would
it not be better for a competent trustee to be used to carry on
the corporate work?
In practice the voting trust is used, not to injure the shareholders, but to protect their interests. Especially is this true
where a reorganization is necessary.
"We think we are safe in saying that experience has shown that, so
far from exercising an injurious influence on trade, voting trusts have
added efficiency, economy, and stability to the administration of corporate
affairs."7

Having stated the arguments above, may the few decisions
which we have as to the enforcibility of such agreements be
classified? One writer has held that in three cases the courts
seem to justify the creation of such a trust; namely: (1) Where
the trust is coupled with an interest, or to protect an interest;
and (2) where the voting trust is a mere means of carrying out
a fixed and binding plan or policy; and (3) in those states where
pooling contracts are sustained, a voting trust which is a mere
instrument for carrying out a pooling agreement will be upheld.8
5 Brown v. Britton, (1899) 58 N. Y. Supp. 353.
6 Baldwin, Voting Trusts, 1 Yale Law Journal 1.
7 Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., (1900) 111 Va. 1.
8
Marion Smith, 22 Columbia Law Review 627-37.
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Ballantine, however, states that "it is believed that this is an
unsound and unwarranted generalization." 9
Since a conflict does exist, just what should be considered in
determining whether or not such an agreement should be upheld?
Seemingly, the purpose of the agreement alone is the one thing
which determines its validity or invalidity. Of course, where
held illegal per se, the purpose is of no importance; but where
such agreements are sustained, even though not necessarily
favored, if formed for a lawful purpose, not in conflict with
public policy, with execution provided for in a proper manner,
such should be upheld. As one text writer says, "the touchstone
of the validity of voting trust agreements is primarily the purpose for which the agreement is formed. If its object is to
advance in a lawful manner the interests of all of the stockholders, usually the agreement is held valid. If its purpose is
to benefit the stockholders forming it at the expense of the other
stockholders or of the corporation, or if it is in the furtherance
of an unlawful or fraudulent design, it will not be sustained.' 0
Again, if the purpose of the voting trust is in accordance with
the views as to commercial rectitude entertained by the Court of
Chancery, the voting trust is generally held valid, otherwise it
is held absolutely void."
A study of the decisions indicates that the early hostility and
denouncement of voting trust agreements has been gradually
disappearing, a clearer understanding tending to uphold such
an agreement where a valid purpose exists. In support of this
change may be mentioned the passage of statutes by various
states authorizing the voting trust agreement. The proposed
Uniform Business Corporation Act provides, in part, that "two
or more stockholders of any domestic corporation may, pursuant to an agreement in writing, transfer their shares to any
person or persons, or to a corporation having authority to act
as a trustee, for the purpose of vesting in such person, or persons, or corporations, as trustee or trustees, all voting or other
rights pertaining to such shares for a period not exceeding ten
years, and upon the terms and conditions stated in the agreement." However, in spite of the fact that hostility has decreased,
it must be recognized that there are two lines of decisions, one
sustaining and the other denying the validity of these trusts.
9 Ballentine, Private Corporations, note, p. 585.
'OSupra, note 2.
11 Frost v. Curse, (1919) 91 N. T. Eq. 124.
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In drafting a voting trust agreement, what should appear
therein? One eminent writer has contributed the following
suggestions:
(1)
The purpose should appear to be for the benefit of the
corporation and the whole body of stockholders.
(2) The trustees should be selected from among the stockholders.
(3)
The substitution and appointment of new trustees for
the original trustees should be provided for.
(4) The agreement should recite valuable consideration other
than mutual promises.
(5)
The arrangement should be open to any stockholders
who wish to join in and deposit their stock.
(6)
The duration should be reasonable.
Provided the agreement is drawn as set out above, there is
12
seemingly no reason to attack it or hold it void.
While there may be some basis for a split of opinion where
the corporation is not in distress, still, where the corporation
is in trouble, business necessity demands a voting trust, such
to be based upon a valid consideration, with a reasonable time
limit fixed for its continuance. Many states have neither statute
nor judicial decisions as to the enforcibility of voting trusts.
Indiana, apparently, is one of these states. Certainly it is high
time that Indiana expresses herself on such an important feature
of present day private corporation law.
12

Ballentine, Private Corporations, p. 588.
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